To rise from the dead and live in the age to come is the appointed destiny of the children of God. In that continuing personal life they are like angels and can no longer die, for as children of the resurrection they are children of God. He is the God, not of the dead, but of the living, for in him all are alive. That was the message of Jesus handed down to us through the Evangelists as an essential part (...) of the Gospel. Jesus did not speak of an ‘immortality’ which depends on the natural force of the soul to resist the corruption of death, but spoke instead of a life-relation with God which cannot terminate for it is anchored beyond our mortal existence in the ever-living God himself. He preferred to speak of this as ‘eternal life’ which is freely given by the heavenly Father to his children on earth and which, far from ending with death, results in a resurrection to a fullness of imperishable life in God. (shrink)

The article examines wittgenstein's theory of quantification as it appears in the "tractatus". it is argued that wittgenstein advances a theory of quantification and a theory of generality where most contemporary writers on the subject hold a single theory of quantification incorporating both quantification proper and generality. having established this it is shown that wittgenstein theory of quantification is truth functional and not substitutional as recent authors have suggested.

Translations show an appreciation of the technical sense with which is endowed in this passage but the terminology which they employ to express that sense is unfortunate. The English term ‘declination’ when used technically in an astronomical context is irreconcilable with the connotations of the Greek term as used in this particular astronomical context. Allowing the technical meaning normal for it in such passages, upon Plutarch's wording, here compressed almost into incomprehensibility, the following construction must be put.

Current interpretations of Plato’s cave are obviously incorrect because they do not explain how what we hear does not come from what we see. I argue that Plato is saying that the colors we receive from our faculty of vision do not cause the sounds that we receive from our faculty of hearing. I also show how we do not see ourselves or one other, how the shadows on the wall of the cave are images of that which casts them (...) and therefore have less reality than them, and how the cave illustrates the divided line’s concern for the relationship between Forms and visible reality. The paper is structured around the two great riddles of the divided line: how Forms can be more real than everyday objects, and how one can know the unhypothesized beginning with complete certainty. I further argue that the puppets that cast shadows stand for the immanent Forms of the Phaedo and also for the moving Forms of the Timaeus. That of which these puppets are themselves images would thus stand for the Forms as they are in themselves of the Phaedo or the indestructible Forms of the Timaeus. ‘Plato used to ask whether the discussion was proceeding from or leading up to fundamental principles, just as in a race course there is a difference between running from the judges to the far end of the track and running back again.’ – Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1095. (shrink)

Socrates contradicts himself when he claims that a good doctor must have the experience of having an unsound body and when he claims that a good judge must have a sound soul, for the unsound of body will not be treated and how a judge decides the case of a good person is a matter of indifference. These pages are really about the meaning of simplicity of soul, and arguing against Glaucon's claim, 'to be moved by self-advantage is the end (...) which it is natural to pursue as good, until forcibly turned aside by law and custom to respect equality'. (shrink)

ABSTRACT: Careful analysis of the details of the text allows us to refine Socrates objections to his definition of manliness as prudent perseverance. He does not appreciate that Socrates objections merely require that he make his definition more precise. Nicias refuses to consider objections to his understanding of manliness as avoiding actions that entail risk. The two sets of objections show that manliness entails first calculating that a risk is worth taking and then subsequently not rejecting that calculation without due (...) consideration. (shrink)

There are four problems to be faced in 710–12. Is πρσει correct? Who was Orestes? What is the construction of 'ρστ? What is the meaning of να μιλν ποδ? A brief review of the evidence collected on the subject of Orestes is the first essential.